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Abstract : Following the US experience, activity-based funding has become the
most common mechanism for reimbursing hospitals in Europe. Focusing on five
European countries (England, Finland, France, Germany and Ireland), this paper
reviews the motivation for introducing activity-based funding, together with the
empirical evidence available to assess the impact of implementation. Despite
differences in the prevailing approaches to reimbursement, the five countries
shared several common objectives, albeit with different emphasis, in moving to
activity-based funding during the 1990s and 2000s. These include increasing
efficiency, improving quality of care and enhancing transparency. There is
substantial cross-country variation in how activity-based funding has been
implemented and developed. In Finland and Ireland, for instance, activity-based
funding is principally used to determine hospital budgets, whereas the models
adopted in the other three countries are more similar to the US approach.
Assessing the impact of activity-based funding is complicated by a shortage
of rigorous empirical evaluations. What evidence is currently available, though,
suggests that the introduction of activity-based funding has been associated with
an increase in activity, a decline in length of stay and/or a reduction in the rate
of growth in hospital expenditure in most of the countries under consideration.
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1. Introduction
In 1983, the US Medicare programme was the first federal programme to
introduce an adjustment for workload complexity within an activity-based
funding model for hospital services. The system used to control for workload
complexity and relative performance was the Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG)
case mix classification system that facilitated the grouping of patients on the
basis of their treatment and resource requirements (Wiley, 2005a). Before this
switch to a system of funding activity adjusted for complexity, the prevailing
approach to reimbursement in the United States was a retrospective cost-based
(fee-for-service) system, which was criticised for being inflationary and for
providing perverse incentives for inappropriate care (US Congress Office of
Technology Assessment, 1985; Kahn et al., 1990). Over the past decade,
activity-based funding has become the predominant mechanism for reimbursing
hospitals in Europe. The main rationale for moving to activity-based funding is
the establishment of a transparent link between funding and activity. For many
European healthcare systems, this link tended to be somewhat obscured where
global budgets were the main mechanism for reimbursing hospitals.
Economic theory posits that by reimbursing hospitals on the basis of a fixed
rate per unit of activity (adjusted for complexity), activity-based funding should
provide a financial incentive to increase activity that is absent under global
budgets. Compared with retrospective fee-for-service systems, improved efficiency
(through minimising costs and input use) would also be encouraged (Aas, 1995;
Newhouse, 1996; Ellis, 1998; Kutzin, 2001; Jegers et al., 2002; Langenbrunner
and Wiley, 2002; Langenbrunner et al., 2005; Busse et al., 2011). Left unchecked,
though, pure activity-based funding could lead to unintended adverse con-
sequences, such as patient selection, inappropriate treatment and quality skimping
(Aas, 1995; Ellis, 1998; Jegers et al., 2002).
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the motivation for introducing
activity-based funding systems, as well as their implementation, in five European
countries – England, Finland, France, Germany and Ireland. The paper also
attempts to discuss the impacts of this reimbursement mechanism, although
empirical evaluations are still somewhat scarce. The five European countries
were selected to illustrate how activity-based funding has been implemented in
healthcare systems with differing organisational structures, financing systems
and public/private sector involvement in the provision of hospital services.
While there are some similarities across these countries in why activity-based
funding was adopted, clear and significant differences are evident in how the
funding system has been adapted and implemented. In England, France and
Germany, the operation of activity-based funding appears to follow a more
conventional model compared to either Finland or Ireland, in that prices are
fixed ex ante. In Finland, the system is used to determine prices principally for
the purposes of hospital billing, although these prices may be subject to change
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ex post to ensure the allocation of adequate funding to hospitals (Vuorenkoski
et al., 2008; Ha¨kkinen, 2010). In Ireland, activity-based payment is used to
adjust hospital budgets for workload complexity and relative performance
(McDaid et al., 2009; Brick et al., 2010).
2. Timing and motivation
Table 1 summarises when and how activity-based funding was introduced in the
selected European countries. For studies on the adoption and implementation of
activity-based funding in other European countries and elsewhere, see, inter alia,
Ettelt et al., 2006; Street et al., 2007; Moreno-Serra and Wagstaff, 2010. In
Ireland in 1993, following a recommendation of the Commission on Health
Funding, an adjustment to hospital budgets based on relative performance and
complexity-adjusted activity was introduced (Commission on Health Funding,
1989; Wiley, 2005b; McDaid et al., 2009). Since its introduction, the scope of
activity-based funding has expanded in Ireland with almost a threefold increase
in the number of participating hospitals (O’Reilly et al., 2011). In Finland, the
move away from the incumbent system of per diem prices towards case-based
payments followed the 1993 reforms under which state subsidies for health care
were paid to municipalities, which were charged with financing hospital care for
their residents (Mikkola and Ha¨kkinen, 2002; Mikkola, 2003). In 1997, one of
the 21 hospital districts in Finland adopted DRGs as a case-based payment
method, with the subsequent adoption throughout the hospital system during
the early part of the following decade (Mikkola and Ha¨kkinen, 2002; Ha¨kkinen,
2005; Ha¨kkinen and Linna, 2005). Currently, 13 out of the 21 districts are using
DRG-based pricing (Ha¨kkinen, 2010; Kautianen et al., 2011).
In England, France and Germany, activity-based funding was introduced at a
national level over a number of years during the 2000s. Even though block
contracts had proved to be effective at containing costs in England, they were
abandoned in favour of activity-based funding, which was consistent with the
prevailing political commitment to reducing waiting lists, facilitating patient
choice and encouraging competition between providers (Miraldo et al., 2006;
Street, 2006; Street and Maynard, 2007). Since the beginning of the 1990s,
DRGs have been promoted in France for measuring hospital activity. Initially, to
gain doctors’ acceptance, DRGs were presented as an epidemiological tool for
monitoring patients (Michelot and Rodrigues, 2008). Over time, the discourse
has changed and activity-based payment using DRGs came to be seen as a good
alternative to global budgets – the precursor to activity-based funding for public
hospitals – which were considered deficient because they did not reflect the
costs and volume of services provided (Bellanger and Tardif, 2006; Ettelt et al.,
2006). Moreover, private-for-profit hospitals, which provide more than half of
all surgery in France, were paid by a mixture of per diem and fee-for-service. The
introduction of a payment scheme based on activity was seen as a way of
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Table 1. Timeline and process of introducing activity-based funding
England Finland France Germany Ireland
Year of initial
introduction of
activity-based funding 2003–2004 1997 2004–2005b 2003–2004 1993
Process of introducing
activity-based funding
Phased in over a
four-year period to
2007–2008a
Introduced on voluntary
basis in some hospital
districts
Phased introduction for
public hospitals
(2004–2008)c
Introduced in four
stages
Phased introduction for
public hospitals
Incumbent
reimbursement
mechanism
Block budgets and
cost and volume
contracts
Per case and per diem
payments
Public and private
not-for-profit hospitals:
Global budgets
Per case and per diem
payments
Global budget
private-for-profit
hospitals: Per diem
payments and
fee-for-service
Characteristics of
healthcare system
Access to hospital
services
Universal, free at
point of use
Universal Universal Universal Universal, although not
necessarily free at point
of use
Provision of hospital
services
Predominantly public
sector
Public and private
sectors
Public and private
sectors
Public and private
sectors
Predominantly public
sector
Main source of
financing
General taxation General taxation Social insurance Social health insurance General taxation
aBut applied with immediate effect to foundation trusts.
bApplies to all hospitals since 2008.
cApplies to private hospitals since 2005. Prices are adjusted for all hospitals until 2012 (Or, 2009).
Sources: Commission on Health Funding (1989), Mikkola and Ha¨kkinen (2002), Ha¨kkinen (2005), Ha¨kkinen and Linna (2005), Wiley (2005b), Bellanger and
Tardif (2006), Epstein and Mason (2006), Ettelt et al. (2006), Miraldo et al. (2006) and Ettelt and Nolte (2010).
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stimulating competition between public and private providers, thereby creating
a level playing field (Or, 2009). In Germany, activity-based funding replaced a
mixed system of per case and per diem payments, limited by hospital budgets,
which potentially had contributed to prolonging hospitalisation beyond that
medically necessary (Lungen and Lapsley, 2003; Busse and Riesberg, 2004;
Lungen et al., 2004; Bo¨cking et al., 2005). Thus, despite different pre-existing
reimbursement regimes, all five countries have chosen to implement reimbur-
sement reform and to move to a form of activity-based funding within the space
of a decade or so.
The introduction of activity-based funding was generally phased in over several
years, allowing hospitals and funders time to adjust to the new reimbursement
mechanism, thereby reducing the likelihood of any potential destabilisation.
However, the length of time for implementation and the methods of adjustment
varied between countries. Initially, the application of activity-based funding was
restricted to particular hospitals (e.g. foundation trusts in England) and/or rela-
tively small proportions of hospital activity (as in England and France), with
initial losses (relative to previous reimbursement) limited (as in Germany). In
addition, reimbursement rates were partially determined by hospitals’ own costs
in all countries (see Busse et al., 2011 for country details). In Ireland, for example,
the budgetary adjustment was initially calculated on the basis of 85% of a
hospital’s own costs and 15% of those of its peer group. By 2011, the share
determined by a hospital’s own cost profile had fallen to 20%. A similar approach
was adopted in Germany where state-wide base rates were phased in over a five-
year period (ending in 2009) during which there was gradual convergence of
hospital-specific reimbursement rates. In France, national DRG prices will be
adjusted for each provider’s own historical costs up until 2012. Over time, then,
countries are moving away from hospital-based reimbursement rates, which is
consistent with Shleifer’s theory of yardstick competition which posited that
potential efficiency gains are maximised when reimbursement rates are entirely
independent of a hospital’s own costs (Shleifer, 1985).
Despite variation across the five countries in implementing activity-based
funding, Table 2 indicates that there were some common policy objectives,
which these disparate systems were expected to achieve, although the emphasis
on particular aims varied across countries. In England, for instance, improving
efficiency had a high priority, while in France, where private hospitals have a
major role in delivering surgery and there is no apparent problem with waiting
times, relatively more emphasis was placed on improving transparency and
fairness of funding between public and private providers, together with deli-
vering better quality care. A number of objectives were mutually re-enforcing:
expanding activity would be expected to help to reduce waiting lists ceteris
paribus. Others, though, were diverse and potentially conflicting: enhancing
efficiency could encourage hospitals to minimise costs to the possible detriment
of the quality of care. Thus, activity-based funding alone cannot achieve all of
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these objectives and, therefore, other instruments are required. Indeed, attain-
ment of these objectives is likely to be influenced by other policies, which also
make it difficult to attribute changes to the implementation of activity-based
funding.
3. Implementation
Although activity-based funding is common to the countries under consideration,
there is substantial cross-country variation in how this mechanism has been
implemented and developed. What follows compares the three main components
(namely, activity covered and calculation of costs and prices) of activity-based
funding in these five countries. This section concludes with an overview of
the specific rules within which activity-based funding operates in each of the
five countries.
3.1 Hospital activity
Table 3 outlines the breadth, depth and scope of hospital activity subject to
activity-based funding in each of the five countries under study. On breadth, all
relevant hospitals are mandated to participate in activity-based funding in
Table 2. Policy objectives for introducing activity-based funding
England Finland France Germany Ireland
Increase efficiency | | | |
Expand activity |
Facilitate patient choice |
Reduce waiting lists |
Improve quality | | |
Ensure the fair allocation of resources
(or funding) across geographical areas,
and across and within healthcare sectors
| | | |
Improve transparency of hospital funding,
activity and management
| | | |
To cover costs of production |
Create a level playing field for payments
to public and private hospitals
| |
Improved documentation of internal
processes and increased managerial
capacity which would in turn result in
improved efficiency and quality
|
Establish link between activity and
funding
| | |
Sources: Commission on Health Funding (1989), Wiley (2005b), Bellanger and Tardif (2006), Epstein
and Mason (2006), Ettelt et al. (2006), Miraldo et al. (2006) and Ettelt and Nolte (2010).
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Table 3. Breadth, scope and depth of hospital activity subject to activity-based funding
England Finland France Germany Ireland
Breadth – hospital
participation
Mandatory | X | | For selected hospitals
Scope – type of hospital
activity
Inpatient and day case | | | | |
Outpatient | | X X |
Exclusions > Renal dialysis,
selected inpatient
and outpatient
treatments and
high cost drugs and
devices
> Mental health
services
> Education
> Research and
development
> Varies by hospital
district, but
generally
psychiatric care
and long-term
intensive care
treatment
> Teaching and
research
> Emergency activity,
psychiatric care,
long-term care,
rehabilitation
> Education,
research and
innovation-related
activities
> Activities of
general public
interest
> Financing
infrastructure
investments
contracted with the
Regional Hospital
Authorities
> Psychiatric care,
psychosomatic
care, psycho-
therapeutic care
> Teaching and
research
> Quality assurance
measures
> Accommodation
costs for
accompanying
persons
> Specialist centres
> Innovative
diagnostic and
treatment
procedures
> Non-acute
psychiatry care
> Long-term care
> Rehabilitation
> Research
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Table 3. (Continued)
England Finland France Germany Ireland
Depth – classification of
hospital activity
Classification system HRG Nord DRG GHM G-DRG AR-DRGe
Number of DRGs 1389a 1020b 2297c 1200d 698f
AR-DRG, Australian Refined Diagnosis-Related Group; DRG, diagnosis-related group; HRG, Healthcare Resource Group; GHM, Groupe Homoge`ne des
Malades; G-DRG, German DRG.
aBased on HRG4.
bBased on 2008 version of the FullDRG, which includes DRGs for inpatient care, day surgery and scheduled and emergency visits.
cBased on version 11.
dBased on the 2010 grouper.
eApplies to day case and inpatient activity. Treatment Related Groups are used for outpatient activity.
fBased on Version 6.0.
Sources: Ettelt and Nolte (2010), NHS Information Centre (2010), Department of Health (2011), Geissler et al. (2011), Kautianen et al. (2011), Kobel et al. (2011),
Mason et al. (2011), Or and Bellanger (2011) and O’Reilly et al. (2011).
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England, France and Germany. In the latter, though, a small number of spe-
cialised hospitals providing highly complex care have been excluded from the
scheme (Ettelt and Nolte, 2010). Full hospital participation minimises the
potential for cost shifting to other institutions within the acute hospital sector,
but hospitals may still try to minimise their own costs by transferring patients
to other parts of the healthcare system that are not subject to this form of
reimbursement.1
Conversely, not all Irish public hospitals participate in the prevailing activity-
based funding scheme, although there are plans to continue to extend the scheme
to incorporate additional public hospitals (Brick et al., 2010). The 2010 budgets of
39 acute public hospitals (accounting for 92% of activity) were adjusted for case
mix (Health Service Executive, 2010a). These participating hospitals are typically
larger than non-participants. In Finland, the adoption of DRG-based pricing is
determined by hospital districts (Ha¨kkinen, 2010). The decentralised nature of the
Finnish healthcare system, together with the absence of national guidance on the
operation of activity-based funding, means that there is considerable variation
across hospital districts in the design and implementation of the scheme at the cost
of reduced transparency and comparability (Ha¨kkinen, 2005).
All five countries currently use activity-based funding to reimburse almost all
day-case and acute inpatient activities. There are, however, some notable
exceptions. For example, it has been recognised that it is particularly difficult to
apply activity-based funding in mental health care due to issues concerning the
classification of related diagnoses and the considerable variation in patient costs
(Ettelt et al., 2006). However, there are plans in England, France and Germany
to extend activity-based funding to this area (Mason and Goddard, 2009;
Geissler et al., 2011; Mason et al., 2011; Or and Bellanger, 2011). A combi-
nation of annual grants and fee-for-service is used to reimburse hospitals for
emergency activity in France (Or, 2009). Most typically, hospitals receive
separate funding for teaching and research activities, the costs of which may not
be adequately reflected in prices under activity-based funding.
Three of the five countries apply activity-based funding to outpatient activity. In
Germany, there is strict organisational division between the provision of inpatient
and outpatient services: regional physicians’ associations have an effective
monopoly over the provision of ambulatory care, while hospitals are permitted to
only undertake inpatient care (Busse and Riesberg, 2004; Schreyo¨gg et al., 2005;
Greß et al., 2006). This separation has prohibited the extension of activity-based
funding to outpatient activity. In France, outpatient services provided in hospital
are paid by a fee-for-service schedule, as in the ambulatory sector.
1 For instance, outpatient activity was not initially included in the US Medicare activity-based pay-
ment system, but instead was funded on a fee-for-service basis (Rosenberg and Browne, 2001; Friesner
and Rosenman, 2004; Bo¨cking et al., 2005; Ellis and Vidal-Ferna´ndez, 2007). Consequently, there was a
shift from inpatient to outpatient treatment and the prospective payment system was subsequently
extended to include outpatient activity in 2000 (Rosenberg and Browne, 2001).
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The scheme used for classifying activity into groups with similar resource use
and clinical characteristics is a crucial component of activity-based funding. In
this, too, significant cross-country differences are apparent (Table 3). Interest-
ingly, each country has adopted a different classification scheme for inpatient
activity, although these are all closely related to the first classification system
adopted by the US Health Care Financing Administration (Schreyo¨gg et al.,
2006a). The successful export of DRGs from the United States to Europe has
been influenced by several factors, including their use in the former for pro-
spective payment, their flexibility and the availability of technology and support
at relatively low cost (Kimberly et al., 1993, 2008). The Australian scheme,
Australian Refined DRGs, was adopted in Germany (with modifications) and in
Ireland. The utility of employing such diverse classification systems, even for
describing relatively homogenous hospital services, could be questioned, but
local adaptations reflect a desire to secure clinical ownership and acceptance of
the classification system.
There is considerable variation in the number of groups each country’s scheme
uses: the number of DRGs in France, for example, is more than three times that
in Ireland (see Table 3). This arises from the introduction of a new version of
DRGs in France where the number of groups has been expanded to allow for
case severity and short-stay DRGs (Or and Bellanger, 2011). There is no con-
sensus in the literature on the optimum number of groups and there are
advantages and disadvantages associated with schemes that have more or fewer
groups. From a theoretical perspective, the benefits of fewer groups (and, con-
sequently, more broadly defined categories) in terms of promoting efficiency and
reducing the scope for data manipulation must be offset against the potential
disadvantages of cherry picking lower-cost patients and skimping on quality
(Busse et al., 2006). Such concerns over quality and access may be negated by
expanding the number of groups, although in addition to potentially increasing
the complexity of data coding, the prospective power of the system may be
greatly diminished if the number of patients per group is too small. At the
extreme, a very fine DRG classification could be similar to fee-for-service
reimbursement (Busse et al., 2006). In France, there currently is an absence of
evidence on whether doubling the number of groups in 2009 helped to reduce
unintended consequences such as data manipulation and gaming.
3.2 Hospital cost
As with the activity data, the five countries have adopted different approaches to
collating cost data (Table 4). The bottom-up approach, as used in Germany and
Finland, is essentially based on patient-level data on resource utilisation to which
unit cost data are applied (Street et al., 2007). Patient-level costing is considered
more accurate because it is based on actual, rather than average, resource utilisation
(Leister and Stausberg, 2005; Street et al., 2007). In the absence of patient-level
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Table 4. Approaches to collation of cost data
England Finland France Germany Irelande
Cost accounting
methodology
Top-down Bottom-up Top-downc Bottom-up Top-down
Sample All National Health
Service (NHS)
hospitalsa
All hospitals in
the largest
hospital district
Sample Sample All selected hospitals
Number (%) of
hospitals in sample
All NHS hospitals 5 (15) 99 (5) 125 (6) 39 (100)
Inclusion of capital
costs
|b | | Xd X
aCost data are from NHS hospitals only. Private providers, to which activity-based funding is now being extended when they care for NHS patients, do not
provide cost data (Mason et al., 2009).
bCovered through activity-based funding and separate grants.
cA small proportion of costs are determined at patient level (Bellanger and Tardif, 2006).
dFinanced by the state governments.
eA pilot project was initiated in 2009 to assess potential approaches to patient-level costing (Health Service Executive, 2010c).
Sources: Ha¨kkinen and Linna (2005), Leister and Stausberg (2005), Schreyo¨gg et al. (2006a, 2006b), Ettelt and Nolte (2010), Geissler et al. (2011), Kautianen
et al. (2011), Mason et al. (2011), Or and Bellanger (2011), O’Reilly et al. (2011) and Tan et al. (2011).
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data, a top-down approach, as currently implemented in England, France and
Ireland, involves the allocation of relevant hospital expenditure to particular
services or specialties (Street et al., 2007). Patient-level information and costing
systems are being implemented in England; however, as of yet, these are not
mandatory (Department of Health, 2009). In Ireland, a pilot project to collate
patient-level costs is underway (Health Service Executive, 2010c).
Cost data can be supplied by a sample of hospitals (as in Finland, France and
Germany), or, alternatively, by the full hospital population participating in activity-
based funding (as in Ireland). There are advantages and disadvantages associated
with both approaches (Schreyo¨gg et al., 2006a). A sample-based approach should
ensure good data quality at a relatively low administrative cost by ensuring that
participating hospitals provide data in a consistent format. However, financial
payments for hospitals had to be introduced in France and Germany to incentivise
the provision of high-quality data in the required format (Schreyo¨gg et al., 2006a).
The payment to German hospitals participating in the voluntary data-sharing
programme comprised a fixed component and a variable fee dependent on the
quality of the data submitted (Schreyo¨gg et al., 2005). One important potential
disadvantage of using a sample is that it may not be representative, a charge that
has been levied against the French and German samples (Bellanger and Tardif,
2006; Schreyo¨gg et al., 2006b). The latter has been criticised for being biased
towards medium and large hospitals and for a low participation rate among public
and private hospitals (Schreyo¨gg et al., 2006b). Convincing French private hos-
pitals to provide their cost data has proved to be particularly difficult. Schreyo¨gg
et al. (2006a) argue that achieving full participation is dependent on hospital
ownership and the ability of the price-setting agency to gain access to the requisite
data. Thus, obtaining data on all participating hospitals is relatively easier in
Ireland, where public hospitals are owned and/or funded by the agency responsible
for determining the reimbursement rate (Schreyo¨gg et al., 2006a). In England, cost
data are from National Health Service (NHS) hospitals only; private providers do
not provide cost data, even though activity-based funding applies to them when
they provide care for NHS patients (Mason and Goddard, 2009).
The reliability of costing methods, as well as the accuracy and transparency of
cost data, are essential for the functioning of activity-based funding. In France,
for example, the lack of transparent cost data to identify efficient providers
and to facilitate an understanding of differences in clinical practice are issues to
be addressed in the ongoing development of the activity-based funding system
(Or and Bellanger, 2011).
The mechanisms for financing capital costs vary across the five countries
(Table 4). By excluding capital costs from activity-based funding (as in Germany
and Ireland), local, regional or national governments have retained control over
decisions regarding, in particular, the planning of new hospital buildings and
equipment. That hospitals should be able to control their costs subject to
activity-based funding, at least in the short term, is a further argument for
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omitting capital costs from this funding system (Schreyo¨gg et al., 2006a). In
France and England, capital costs are (at least in principle) included in DRG
prices. However, an unmeasured part of capital costs is funded through specific
payments to French public hospitals to help them finance costly investment
plans imposed by the recent healthcare reforms (Or and Bellanger, 2011).
3.3 Determining the price/tariff
Prices are set at a national level in three of the five countries considered (England,
France and Ireland). In Germany, it has been agreed that the 16 base rates at state
level will gradually converge to a narrow range at federal level between 2010 and
2014. At the end of this period, the acceptable regional variation will be between
12.5% and21.25%. After 2015, a decision, informed by research on the reasons
for variation in the state base rates, will be made about the possibility of having a
single federal rate (Ettelt and Nolte, 2010). Under the decentralised healthcare
system in Finland, prices vary across hospital districts, reflecting payment systems
decided at local levels. However, nationally determined prices may also incor-
porate local factors. For instance, in England, the Market Forces Factor allows
prices to be adjusted for local variation in input prices (Street and Maynard, 2007;
Mason et al., 2009).
Although all providers – public and private – treating publicly funded patients
are subject to activity-based funding in England, France and Germany, they may
not necessarily face the same price. In France, the tariff applied to public and
private not-for-profit hospitals includes all costs associated with a hospital stay,
while the equivalent for private-for-profit hospitals excludes doctors’ fees. It was
intended that the prices in the two sectors would converge by 2012, but this
deadline was recently extended to 2018 (Or, 2009). Whether the public and
private sectors should face the same tariffs is an issue of some debate. A uniform
tariff may be expected to increase competition between the public and private
sectors ceteris paribus. However, if hospitals’ costs are not entirely within their
control, such competition may be deleterious to quality of care. Moreover,
ignoring structural differences between hospitals in setting prices may endanger
the system’s capacity to provide necessary (complex) care as well as equity of
access. Therefore, differentiated tariffs can be used to adjust for exogenous cost
differences and, thereby, create a ‘fair playing field’ between the public and
private sectors (Mason et al., 2009: 385).
In all five countries, average costs are used as the basis for determining the tariff.
This has been criticised on a number of grounds. First, rewarding hospitals at full
average cost for activity provides an incentive to increase activity as long as
marginal cost is less than or equal to price/average cost; this could result in the
provision of care that is financially unsustainable and/or medically inappropriate
(Mannion et al., 2008). Second, the association between prices and average cost
encourages convergence to the mean, rather than incentivising improvement in
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performance (Street and Maynard, 2007). To secure performance improvements in
2010–2011, the English Department of Health imposed a 3.5% reduction in tariffs
(somewhat akin to price-cap regulation), applied across all hospitals irrespective of
their current level of performance (Department of Health, 2010). Similarly, the
2011–2012 tariffs have been set at ‘1% below the mean average of reported costs’
(Department of Health, 2011: 12). Third, cost-based prices may not reflect the
value of outputs and, therefore, may result in the production of a sub-optimal mix
of outputs from a societal perspective (Smith and Street, 2005; Street et al., 2010).
Recent initiatives have moved away from average cost pricing in an attempt to
encourage quality improvements and to reduce unexplained variation in clinical
practice. The introduction of best practice tariffs in England establishes a link
between payment and the efficient provision of high-quality care (such as day-case
treatment where appropriate, or following evidence-based clinical guidelines
or protocols for complex treatments, etc.) (Department of Health, 2010). In
Germany, adjustments are made to hospital payments under some ‘integrated care’
contracts to take account of certain quality indicators (Or and Ha¨kkinen, 2011).
Almost all countries have introduced price adjustments and/or supplementary
payment mechanisms in recognition of the inherent limitations of activity-based
funding for certain types of activity or cases. Thus, while prices may be determined
in advance, adjustments for extreme outlier cases (typically using per diem pay-
ments based on length of stay) mean that the system is not truly prospective and
that some of the financial risk is shared between funders and providers. In England,
a top-up is added to the prices paid to hospitals that undertake specialised services
to offset the potentially higher costs they might incur from treating more complex
patients (Department of Health, 2010, 2011; Daidone and Street, 2011).
Certain expensive drugs and devices are not subject to activity-based funding
in four of the five countries (the exception being Finland), but paid on top of the
DRG price (see, e.g. Henschke et al., 2010). In France, expenditure growth in
this area greatly outstripped that for activity subject to activity-based funding
between 2005 and 2007 (37% vs 4%, respectively; Or, 2009). Interestingly, in
Germany, the number of supplementary fees available increased from 26 in
2004 when they were introduced to 143 in 2010 (Schreyo¨gg et al., 2005;
Geissler et al., 2011). This increase may reflect the inadequacies of activity-based
funding to reimburse hospitals for certain complex or cost-intensive services, but
may also reveal hospitals’ attempts to shift costs to areas not covered by activity-
based funding. In England, there is an annually updated list of high cost drugs
and devices for which prices are negotiated locally rather than set nationally
(Department of Health, 2011).
3.4 Control mechanisms
Under a pure form of activity-based funding, hospitals’ financial incentive to
increase activity could result in unsustainable expenditure and might potentially
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be associated with adverse health outcomes. All five countries under con-
sideration have adopted different approaches to attempt to tackle this issue. In
England, Germany and Ireland, the volume of services is agreed at a local level
and specified in contracts between hospitals and funders. In England, the extent
to which these contracts translate into binding budget constraints is dependent
on the size of the budget allocated to the commissioning agency (primary care
trust) and its ability to manage demand for hospital services (Mannion and
Street, 2005; Oliver, 2005). While evidence suggests that commissioning agen-
cies have been successful in transferring certain services from hospitals to the
community, there are concerns that their ability to exercise control over hospital
activity and expenditure may be somewhat weakened in the absence of an
explicit threshold limit on hospital activity and due to other policies such as
patient choice (Street and Maynard, 2007; Mannion et al., 2008).
In Germany, DRG prices are adjusted if services are provided in excess of
(below) the volume agreed under the annual contract negotiated between
sickness funds and hospitals (Busse and Riesberg, 2004; Geissler et al., 2011).
Therefore, the hospital’s incentive to increase activity over the agreed level is
diminished. In France, too, this strategy is also used, although its practical
application differs: if hospital expenditure exceeds a national target level, then
all hospitals (regardless of their individual performance) face reduced prices.
This has been criticised for creating uncertainty over the prices faced by hospitals
(Or, 2009). A more targeted policy of marginal pricing applies to emergency
activity in England whereby emergency activity above a threshold based on
historic activity levels is reimbursed at a rate of just 30% of the tariff (Department
of Health, 2010).
In Finland, municipalities and hospital districts negotiate the volume and
cost of services. The budget of each hospital district is based on these negotia-
tions and is formally decided by a Council (with members appointed by each
municipality), which is also responsible for determining the pricing method and
the level of prices. If the hospital district budget is exceeded, the municipalities
must cover the deficit from their own revenues, usually by paying hospitals
higher prices for services. In the case of budgetary surplus, the prices paid by
municipalities can be lowered (Ha¨kkinen and Linna, 2005; Ha¨kkinen, 2010).
Thus, hospitals have no incentive to keep within budget since any deficit is
covered ex post. In contrast, Finnish municipalities must balance annually their
resource allocation to hospital care with that to other public services sectors.
Increases in hospital costs must be financed either by increasing the local tax
rate or by reducing resources allocated to social services (including day care
for children), cultural services or sports halls, etc. Hence, municipalities have
incentives for efficient cost sharing. There is now increasing evidence that
Finnish hospitals are more efficient than hospitals in other Nordic countries
(Linna et al., 2006, 2010; Kittelsen et al., 2009). Although there has been no
formal research to explain this finding, one possible explanation that has been
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proposed is that Finnish municipalities are more effective at controlling costs
than the counties/regions in Sweden and Denmark, or the central government in
Norway (Ha¨kkinen, 2010).
4. Impact
Formal evaluation of the impact of activity-based funding in the selected
countries is largely lacking (Scheller-Kreinsen et al., 2009). Several possible
explanations can be advanced for this. First, the relatively recent introduction
of activity-based funding in some of these countries means that it may be too
soon to assess its impact (especially if there is a lag in the availability of the
requisite data). Second, activity-based funding is not implemented in controlled
environments and, therefore, it can be difficult to isolate its effect from that of
other policies introduced concomitantly. Thus, changes in the parameters of
interest may not easily be attributed to the introduction of activity-based
funding. Furthermore, the potential for activity-based funding to achieve the
objectives of increased activity and improved efficiency may depend on each
country’s starting point in terms of the previous reimbursement mechanism, as
well as the specific design and governance of the new system (Street et al., 2011).
In France, for instance, a lack of transparency in price setting and additional
payments appear to have contributed to uncertainty within the hospital sector
that may ultimately undermine the expected outcomes of activity-based funding.
From a methodological perspective, short study periods may be unlikely to
detect changes arising from the introduction of activity-based funding if the
reforms have been phased in over a number of years (as has been the case for
some of the countries considered in this paper). Conversely, results identified in
studies with longer timeframes may be subject to potential confounding factors
due to the introduction of other policies during the interim period. Few studies
have attempted to control explicitly for the effects of such confounders.
Cognisant of these problems, this section reviews what evidence does exist on
the impact of activity-based funding on hospital efficiency, as well as on the
quality of care and of clinical data.
A common objective for moving to activity-based funding was to improve
hospital efficiency by some combination of increasing activity, reducing costs
and introducing an element of competition between hospitals (Table 2). How-
ever, no studies of the explicit impact on efficiency per se have been undertaken
for the countries under consideration. Nevertheless, some studies have reported
changes in indicators of efficiency – in particular, activity, length of stay, costs
and quality.
The link between funding and activity under activity-based funding provides
hospitals with incentives to increase patient throughput. Indeed, this hypothesis
is supported by the empirical evidence in Table 5, which shows that the volume
of activity did increase following the introduction of activity-based funding in
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Table 5. Summary of studies of changes in activity, length of stay, cost and quality following introduction of activity-based funding
Country Study
Methodology/
study period Activity Length of stay Cost
Quality of patient
care
Quality of data and
clinical coding
England Audit Commission
(2008b)
Descriptive/
2003–2004 to
2006–2007
Increase in inpatient
activity (total and
activity subject to
activity-based funding),
day-case activity, and
short-stay admissions
Decrease n/a No impact on
mortality and
readmissions
within 28 days
n/a
Audit Commission
(2008a)
Descriptive/
2007–2008
n/a n/a n/a n/a Average clinical coding
error of 16.5% across
primary and secondary
diagnosis and procedure
coding (range from 1%
to 76%)
National mean HRG
error rate of 9.4%
Audit Commission
(2009)
Descriptive/
2008–2009
n/a n/a n/a n/a Average clinical coding
error rate of 12.8%
National mean HRG
error rate of 8.1%
Farrar et al.
(2009)a
Difference-in-
difference
analysis/
2003–2004 to
2004–2005b
Increase in volume
of care and in
proportion of activity
undertaken on
a day-case basis
Decrease n/a Little evidence of
an association
between introduction
of activity-based
payments and quality
of care (in-hospital
mortality, 30-day
post-surgical mortality,
hip fracture emergency
readmissions)
n/a
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Table 5. (Continued)
Country Study
Methodology/
study period Activity Length of stay Cost
Quality of patient
care
Quality of data and
clinical coding
Audit Commission
(2010)
Descriptive/
2009–2010
n/a n/a n/a n/a Average clinical coding
error rate of 11.3%
National mean HRG
error rate of 9.1%d
Finland Mikkola and
Ha¨kkinen (2002)
Count data
models/
1994–1998
n/a Decrease for
hip and knee
replacements,
but not for
lumbar
discectomies
n/a n/a n/a
Mikkola (2003) Panel data
models/
1991–1998
Increase in number of
lumbar discectomies.
Decrease in number of
hip replacements. No
statistically significant
impact on number of
knee replacements
n/a n/a n/a n/a
Ha¨kkinen and
Linna (2005)
Review n/a n/a n/a n/a Increased coding of
procedures and
secondary diagnoses
France Ministry of Health
(2009, 2010)
Descriptive/
2005–2009
Public hospitals:
increase in day-case
and inpatient activity
in 2007-2008 and
2008-2009
Slight decrease
for acute
inpatient care
in public
hospitals
Annual growth
rate in total
hospital
expenditure:
n/a Some upcoding,
particularly of day cases
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Table 5. (Continued)
Country Study
Methodology/
study period Activity Length of stay Cost
Quality of patient
care
Quality of data and
clinical coding
Private hospitals: increase
in day-case activity and
slight decrease in
inpatient activity
between 2006 and 2009
4.2% in 2005
5.6% in 2006
4.2% in 2007
3.8% in 2008
3.6% in 2009
Germany Bo¨cking et al.
(2005)
Review Increase Decrease n/a n/a n/a
Schreyo¨gg et al.
(2005)
Descriptive/
2003–2004
n/a Decreasec n/a n/a n/a
Hensen et al.
(2008)
Descriptive/
2003–2006
Increase in number
of patients and same
day patients
Decrease n/a No change in
number of patients
readmitted
Decrease in average
number of coded
diagnoses
Increase in average
number of coded
procedures in 2006
Ireland Brick et al. (2010) General reviewe Increase in number
of day cases and
inpatients
Decrease Increase in
public expenditure
on hospitals
n/a n/a
n/a, not available.
aResults also reported in Farrar et al. (2007).
bSome results are reported for the period 2003–2004 to 2005–2006.
cThe scale of this reduction was consistent with the longer run trend in length of stay (Schreyo¨gg et al., 2005).
dThis error rate was calculated on the basis of HRG4, which was introduced in 2009–2010. According to the Audit Commission, this version of HRG4 is
more sensitive to coding errors due (principally) to its larger number of HRGs. If HRG4 was used to classify patients in 2008-2009, then there would have
been a 1.8% improvement in the HRG error rate (Audit Commission, 2010).
eGeneral review of trends in public hospital activity, length of stay and expenditure; not specifically focused on assessing changes following the introduction of
activity-based funding.
See also O’Reilly et al. (2011).
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England (Farrar et al., 2007, 2009; Audit Commission, 2008b), France (Ministry
of Health, 2009, 2010) and Germany (Bo¨cking et al., 2005; Hensen et al., 2008).
As noted above, though, factors other than the introduction of activity-based
funding may have affected this outcome. For example, in England, the introduc-
tion of activity-based funding was contemporaneous with large funding increases
to the NHS and the use of other policy instruments, such as waiting time targets,
so isolating its specific impact is virtually impossible (Propper et al., 2007; Audit
Commission, 2008b; Farrar et al., 2009; see also Sussex and Farrar, 2009).
Not only has hospital activity increased in absolute terms but there has also
been a change in its composition. In an attempt to increase patient throughput
while minimising costs, hospitals have increased the proportion of activity
undertaken on a day-case basis (Farrar et al., 2007; Or, 2009). In England, while
attempts to encourage hospitals to shift towards day-case activity date from the
1970s, activity-based funding coupled encouragement with financial incentives:
the national elective tariff was set equal to the weighted average costs for
inpatients and day cases (Boyle, 2005; Ettelt et al., 2006; Street, 2006; Depart-
ment of Health, 2007; Ellis and Vidal-Ferna´ndez, 2007; Street and Maynard,
2007). With such a tariff, the incentive for hospitals to minimise costs encouraged
a more rapid change from (relatively more expensive) inpatient to (relatively less
expensive) day-case treatment than had been observed previously (Street and
Miraldo, 2007; Farrar et al., 2009). The resulting increase in day-case treatment
meant that the national tariff would over time converge towards the average
day-case cost, thereby reducing the proportion of inpatient costs covered (Street
and Maynard, 2007) and incentivising a further shift to day-case activity.
In France, private for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals have been quick to
respond to the new system by increasing their activity, as well as their market
share in day cases (Ministry of Health, 2009). There were concerns, however, that
some of the increase in day-case activity may be a consequence of deliberate
‘up-coding’ of activity and/or inappropriate treatment, rather than more efficient
service delivery. To avoid potential abuse of the system, the health insurance fund
introduced a definition of day-case activity with the result that there was a decline
in such activity between 2006 and 2007 (Or and Bellanger, 2011).
Of course, changes in the recording of clinical data following the introduction
of activity-based funding may not always serve to misrepresent patient data for
the purposes of receiving higher reimbursement. Steinbusch et al. (2007) argue
that the risk of upcoding is dependent on the specific design and operation of the
DRG systems, as well as broader issues, such as the market characteristics
(including the presence of for-profit hospitals) and the instruments employed to
prevent upcoding. Thus, the risk of upcoding would be expected to be lower in
systems where there are no for-profit providers; coders’ remuneration is inde-
pendent of the outcome of the coding process; the DRG assignment does not
take place after discharge; and classification criteria are aligned with clinical
practice. In Finland, coding of procedures and secondary diagnoses improved
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following the reimbursement reform, although it could be argued that the Finnish
operation of activity-based funding does not provide strong incentives for
upcoding (Ha¨kkinen and Linna, 2005). Even in England, though, where there is a
more explicit link between coding and payment, the Audit Commission, in its first
national audit of clinical data in 2007–2008, concluded that there was little
evidence of deliberate upcoding since errors were random, resulting in both
positive and negative financial outcomes (Audit Commission, 2008a). The error
rate fell in subsequent financial years (Audit Commission, 2009, 2010).
Consistent with increased day-case activity, length of stay has declined in
England, Germany and Ireland, although some argue that this was merely
consistent with a general trend towards shorter hospital stays (Bo¨cking et al., 2005;
Schreyo¨gg et al., 2005; Audit Commission, 2008b; Brick et al., 2010).
The consequences of these changes on costs and quality of care are not
straightforward. Increased patient throughput may be expected to result in
increased aggregate expenditure on hospital services (as in France; Or, 2009), yet
the costs per case may be lower (as in England, proxied by changes in length of
stay and share of day-case activity; Farrar et al., 2009). Quality of care might be
adversely affected if patients are discharged from hospital ‘quicker and sicker’; but
shorter hospital stays are associated with a lower probability of acquiring hospital
infections ceteris paribus (Kosecoff et al., 1990; Clarke, 1996). Evidence on the
effects on the quality of care from the countries under consideration is very
limited, but two evaluations found that the quality of English hospital care was
not, in fact, adversely affected by the introduction of activity-based funding
(Farrar et al., 2007, 2009; Audit Commission, 2008b). However, despite advances
in the measurement of patient outcomes and quality of care, on the whole defi-
ciencies remain in most of the countries under study (Or and Ha¨kkinen, 2011).
For example, in France, Germany and Ireland, indicators such as readmission
rates and complication rates are not routinely available.
5. Discussion
In the past decade, activity-based funding has become the most common
mechanism for reimbursing hospitals in Europe. In the five countries under
consideration here, this reform was aimed at achieving a long and varied list of
policy objectives, some of which were common across these countries (e.g.
increase efficiency, improve quality, enhance transparency), albeit with differing
emphasis. At a cursory glance, there are some broad similarities across countries –
for example, almost all systems incorporate a form of risk sharing between
providers and funders for high cost, complex cases. However, at a more detailed
level, it is clear that the schemes have been tailored for the country-specific
contexts in which they operate. Thus, the practical implementation of activity-
based funding depends on, inter alia, the relationships between providers and
funders, the degree of (de)centralisation in the healthcare system, the separation
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between purchasing and provision and the structure of the hospital market
(share of private hospitals, level of competition between public and private
hospitals, etc.). Alongside these contextual factors, practical considerations are
also important: success appears to be contingent on the availability of a robust
information system together with flexible and transparent management and
governance structures, which can support continuous fine-tuning of the system.
The heterogeneity across countries is most evident from the fact that the five
countries differ with regard to the DRG scheme adopted or locally developed,
together with the approaches pursued for system implementation, costing and
pricing. These differences make cross-country comparisons difficult and may
limit the extent to which country-specific models of activity-based funding may
be transplanted to other countries. Notwithstanding these constraints, what is
encouraging is that the sharing of experience, techniques and tools in the
international context can greatly assist those working on the development of
local models and addressing local implementation issues.
Assessing the success of activity-based funding in achieving the stated policy
objectives is complicated by the shortage of formal evaluations, together with
their relatively recent adoption. Preliminary indications, though, suggest that
following the introduction of activity-based funding, activity increased, length
of stay declined and total hospital expenditure grew (albeit at a slower rate).
Even so, it is difficult to attribute these changes exclusively to the funding reform
due to the presence of confounding factors. Further empirical evaluation is
required so that the strengths of this reimbursement model may be exploited and
any weaknesses addressed.
Since its adoption by the five countries under consideration, the use of
activity-based funding in reimbursing hospitals has evolved and will continue to
do so. In England, the tariff has been used as an instrument to encourage a shift
from inpatient to day-case treatment, to improve efficiency and, with recent
moves away from cost-based to best-practice-based pricing, to ensure evidence-
based clinical practice in line with national guidance (Department of Health,
2011). The Irish Health Service Executive has committed to moving to a pro-
spective model of activity-based funding (Health Service Executive, 2010d). In
addition, activity-based funding (and the associated information systems) can be
used to incentivise improved quality of care (Or and Ha¨kkinen, 2011), as is
currently underway in the United States (see, e.g. Pronovost et al., 2008;
McNair et al., 2009; Goldfield, 2010). In Germany, for instance, hospitals have
an incentive to avoid readmissions because they will not receive additional
reimbursement for cases readmitted for the same cause within 30 days of the
initial admission (Geissler et al., 2011). A similar rule has been introduced in
England (Department of Health, 2011).
The application of activity-based funding is also extending beyond hospital
reimbursement. In Ireland, for example, consultants’ complexity-adjusted
workload is estimated using data derived from the funding model and is the
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basis for monitoring compliance with the ratio of public to private practice
specified in their employment contract (Health Service Executive, 2008).
Alongside activity-based funding systems, patient classification systems provide
a means of quantifying comparative hospital performance. In Finland, the
Hospital Benchmarking project provides hospitals with information on effi-
ciency and productivity (Linna and Ha¨kkinen, 2008; Ha¨kkinen, 2010). Simi-
larly, HealthStat in Ireland produces comparative information on hospital
performance (Health Service Executive, 2010b).
In the relatively short time period since activity-based funding was adopted in the
five European healthcare systems under study, it has already evolved quite rapidly,
contributing to efficiency improvements in their acute hospital sectors. The future
direction for activity-based funding is clear: further adaptations will be necessary to
address fully the increasing emphasis on quality of care and value-based purchasing,
as well as to deliver integrated care through episode-based payment (as currently
advocated in the United States, see Goldfield, 2010). Extending the reimbursement
mechanism beyond the hospital sector will be required if these objectives are to
be addressed. The recent developments discussed above indicate that progress is
underway on adapting activity-based funding to meet these future challenges.
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